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Federalism, Regionalism and the Dynamics of Party Politics 
 
Eve Hepburn and Klaus Detterbeck 
 
Introduction 
Unlike many other scholarly fields covered in this Handbook, political party scholarship has 
been relatively slow in responding to changed understandings of state structures resulting from 
federalism and regionalism. Whilst territorial politics has been on the agenda of political science 
for at least the last 30 years (albeit in the background – see Loughlin in this volume; Keating, 
2009), comparative studies of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties began to emerge in 
the 1990s (De Winter and Türsan, 1998), whilst conceptual analyses of state-wide party 
adaptation to federal, regionalized and multi-level states have only just surfaced in the last 
decade. Why is this? Why did party scholars come so late to the territorial politics table?  
One explanation is practical: some of the most radical changes to state structures, 
resulting in the wholesale transferral of powers to substate levels, have only occurred in the last 
twenty or so years (despite the persistence of territory as a constant factor shaping politics since 
the birth of the ‘nation-state’ in the late eighteenth century – see Keating, 1998). This is 
especially true for formerly centralised states such as Spain, the UK and Italy, which have 
witnessed unprecedented levels of decentralisation from the 1980s onwards. Of course, ‘coming 
together’ federations such as the USA, Switzerland and Australia or more ‘recently’ formed 
federal democracies like Germany and India empowered the substate level decades ago. The 
lack of scholarly attention to territorial politics in these cases may result from a second 
explanation, which is normative in nature: party scholars, like most political scientists, tend to 
focus on the nation-state as the only meaningful unit of political science (Jeffery and Wincott, 
2011). Indeed, scholarly understandings of parties are overwhelmingly state-centric, whereby 
parties are largely seen as seeking to control the machinery of the state and to represent the 
interests of the state citizenry. These understandings fall through, however, when pitched 
against the reality of most democracies today. Party politics no longer (if they ever did) 
exclusively take place at the state level; it does so at multiple – intertwining – levels: 
neighbourhood, local, regional, provincial, state and in some cases (such as the EU member-
states), supranational.  
 It is the multi-levelled nature of the state that has caused so much head-scratching 
amongst scholars on how to conceptualize the role, structure and functions of parties. Political 
parties are generally considered to be the main instruments of national integration across states, 
through their representative functions and coordinated policy-making (Caramani, 2004). 
However, the challenges of spatial rescaling along federal and regional lines, or 
‘territorialization’ to put it another way (see below), have forced state-wide parties to adapt 
both programmatically and organizationally to the new political realities of multi-level political 
structures and have challenged their integrative role and capacity.  
Spatial rescaling requires that state-wide parties adapt to the creation, or strengthening, 
of several institutional loci of decision-making at different territorial levels, which may contain 
diverse electoral systems with distinct structures of party competition (Swenden and Maddens, 
2009). However, recent institutional change is not the only territorial factor causing state-wide 
parties to alter their focus and strategies. Some issues have long caused state-wide parties to 
differentiate their organization in different parts of the country. The first is the mounting 
evidence of the fact that sub-state regions can ‘generate and sustain political cultures, serving 
as “small worlds” for citizens’ (Henderson, 2010). Regions have become containers of political 
attitudes and behaviour, as well as social and political identities, which diverge from other parts 
of the state even in the absence of regional political institutions (Elkins and Simeon, 1980; 
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Moreno, 1999). The second factor is the pressure state-wide parties have faced from the 
inexorable rise of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (Hepburn, 2009). Massetti (2009) 
maintains that the number of SNRPs operating in Western Europe has more than tripled in the 
last thirty years, from 29 to 93. Furthermore, these parties are gaining in strength and power, 
regularly entering government at the sub-state, and sometimes the nation-state, level (Elias and 
Tronconi, 2011). As a result of these three factors – institutional reforms, societal conditions 
and party competition – state-wide parties must refocus their strategies for different regional 
contexts and tackle regional issues head-on. This requires a deviation from the ‘state-wide’ 
logic of party politics as state-wide parties must increasingly cope with an era of ‘de-
nationalization’ (Hough and Jeffery, 2006: 7). 
Although it has taken some time and effort to convince scholars that territory is not an 
irrelevance or a ‘residual’ factor in shaping party politics (see Keating, 2009; Jeffery and 
Wincott, 2011), it appears that issues of federalism and regionalism are increasingly on the 
radar of mainstream party scholarship, evident in a recent special issue of the journal of Party 
Politics dedicated to Decentralization and State-wide Parties (Hopkin and Van Houten, 2009). 
Indeed, there has recently been a small surge of academic inquiry into the ‘resurgence of 
territory’ in party politics. First steps have been made towards analysing the effects of state 
decentralization on formal party structures and programmes (Carty, 2004; van Biezen and 
Hopkin, 2006; Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006; Fabre, 2008; Maddens and Swenden, 2009; 
Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010), the impact of devolution on electoral politics (Hough and 
Jeffery 2006), the mechanics of party systems at different levels (Deschouwer, 2003, 2006; 
Thorlakson, 2006, 2009; Detterbeck, 2012), and the degree of symmetry (or congruence) 
between coalition governments at different territorial levels (Stefuriuc, 2009). However, we 
still lack some of the conceptual tools for understanding how parties – both state-wide parties 
and SNRPs – have responded to the dynamics of multi-level systems. This aim of this chapter 
is make a modest contribution in addressing this gap, by exploring what we call the 
‘territorialization’ of parties and party competition in federal and regionalized systems.  
 
Federalism, Regionalism and Parties 
Over the last few decades, states throughout the world have witnessed significant spatial 
restructuring of powers down to lower levels (Marks et al., 2008). The result of these territorial 
reforms of states has been the empowerment of the sub-state level, and in some cases the 
creation of new political regions. This trend is particularly marked in Europe, where all of the 
large west European states – such as the Germany, France, the UK, Spain, Austria and Italy, 
and some of its smaller ones, like Belgium and Switzerland – have created new, or strengthened 
existing, regional tiers of authority.1 Marks, Hooghe and Schakel (2008) created a ‘regional 
authority index’ that illustrates the scope and depth of the institutionalization of regions during 
the period 1950-2006. Of the 42 mainly OECD countries examined, half of them had created 
regional tiers of authority and only two became marginally more centralized. This astonishing 
finding confirms that ‘the current trend is away from centralization and the nation-state’ (Jeffery 
and Wincott 2010: 168). States no longer constitute the ‘main locus of power and decision’ 
(Loughlin, this volume) if, indeed, they ever did. Sub-state legislatures have carved out their 
own spaces as sources of power and decision-making, becoming focal points for territorial 
interest representation (Hough and Jeffery, 2006). As such we can confidently say that sub-state 
                                                 
1 This was evident in Italy from 1970 when powers were transferred to 15 ordinary regions (Palermo, 2005); in 
Spain during the 1980s with the implementation of a regional system of 17 autonomous communities (Moreno, 
2001; Colino, 2008); in France with the creation of 22 newly elected regional councils in 1982 (Cole 2006; 
Loughlin, 2007); Belgium in 1995 when it became a federation (Deschouwer, 2005); the UK from 1998 when 
new regional legislatures were created in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Mitchell, 2009); and Germany 
from the late 1990s with the strengthening of Laender powers (Detterbeck and Jeffery, 2009). Cases outside 
Europe include Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Philippines, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. 
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regions have become a ‘core feature of west European politics’ (Hough and Jeffery, 2006: 7). 
This radical transformation of the state poses important questions for the role, aims, focus and 
structure of political parties. 
Studies of political parties and party systems, like the rest of social science, have been 
dominated by a state-centric bias and theories of ‘nationalization’. Scholars like Caramani 
(2004) and Chhibber and Kollman (2004) have argued that party systems and competition have 
become more nationalized in much of the industrialized West, with a homogenization of 
political structures and processes across the state. These studies assume that political parties are 
single, homogenous organizations with authority and decision-making centralized in the hands 
of the national executive. However, there is good reason to review and question the classical 
assumption on the integrative function of political parties in multi-level political systems. 
Political parties might once have been ‘geared to obtaining control of the apparatus of the 
central state’ (Loughlin, this volume) but that is no longer the case in federal or regionalized 
states, whereby many of the functions and powers of states have been devolved downwards. 
The decentralization of states has put the integrative functions of parties under severe pressure, 
forcing parties to re-evaluate how best to respond to, and represent, the diverse needs and 
interests of the electorate. This challenge has become all the more pressing in light of other 
significant challenges such as the decline of state-wide party membership, the rise of smaller 
single-issue parties (and in particular, radical-right parties), supranational integration and 
globalization, amongst other factors. Parties now operate in an increasingly complex and 
volatile environment with increased competition for votes.  
Political parties have, of course, responded to these challenges in different ways – and 
unpacking these different strategies is a further aim of this chapter. In particular, ‘context varies 
and so do the internal preconditions for organizing multi-layered parties’ thereby resulting in 
diverse party solutions to these problems (Detterbeck, 2012). We can, however, make some 
general preliminary comments. The first is that parties have adopted diverse, changeable and 
often contradictory stances on territorial issues. Certainly, some of these parties were at the 
helm of the decentralization reforms, arguing that regional autonomy was a solution to 
administrative overload at the centre, a democratic gesture recognizing the identities of stateless 
nations and regions, or a panacea to problems emanating from the challenges of nationalist 
parties (such as the Belgian Christian Democrat, Liberal and Socialist parties that presided over 
several rounds of federal reforms). Others criticized regionalization reforms, arguing that they 
would lead to the eventual break-up of the state or, at the very least, a significant loss of 
sovereignty (such as the UK Conservatives and Partido Popular in Spain).  
However, many parties changed their position in an opportunistic and instrumental 
fashion, moving repeatedly back and forth on the ‘territorial question’ (Meguid, 2008; Hepburn, 
2010; Toubeau, 2011). We have sought to account for this repositioning of parties on the issue 
of dececentralisation in figures 1 and 2. The most dramatic change over time was evident in the 
European Left, which moved from a highly centralist position during the post-war period 
through to the 1960s and 1970s to becoming staunch advocates of decentralizing policies from 
the 1990s as part of a ‘good governance’ strategy. The most notable parties here were the 
Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), which moved from a Jacobin-oriented perspective of the state 
to supporting the creation of Spanish autonomous communities (Moreno, 2001); the Left in 
Italy (represented initially by the Italian Communist and Socialist Parties, then the Democrats 
of the Left, and currently the Democratic Party) which moved from supporting a centralised, 
unitarist model of the state to advocating a true ‘regionalisation’ in the 1980s and moves 
towards federalisation in the 2000s (Hepburn, 2010); the French Communist Party and various 
elements of the French Socialist Party (e.g. Chevènement, Mouvement des Citoyens) which 
moved from anti-decentralization in the 1960s and 1970s to pro-déconcentration reforms in 
France in the 1980s (Loughlin, 2007); and finally the British Labour Party, which was firmly 
opposed to decentralisation in the 1960s, divided on the first devolution referendum in the 
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1970s and the primary instigator of devolution following a second referendum in the 1990s 
(Bradbury, 2006). 
 
Figure 1: Statewide party positions on ideology and decentralisation, 1970s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Right in Europe, meanwhile, re-positioned itself less radically than the Left, from 
endorsing degrees of administrative, though not political decentralization (called in French 
déconcentration) – often from a neoliberal standpoint (see Loughlin, this volume), to outright 
contempt for some political devolutionary measures (especially in the UK, Spain). This position 
was most evident amongst the British Conservatives, which did support administrative 
decentralisation in the 1960s (unlike Labour), however it was entirely hostile to political 
devolution in the 1970s and 1990s (Hepburn, 2010). In contrast, the position of the Right in 
Spain and Italy has been generally hostile to the political decentralisation of power or 
recognition of substate identities, and thus the positions of these parties have not changed a 
great deal between the 1970s and the 2000s, as shown in figures 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 2: Statewide party positions on ideology and decentralisation, 2000s 
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Of course, some party families have a more principled approach to decentralization, 
evident in their more-or-less stable support for bringing power ‘closer to the people’ – and the 
Christian Democrat defence of the principle of subsidiarity is notable here, especially in Italy, 
Austria and Germany (Swenden and Maddens, 2009). Here, we see little ‘movement’ in figures 
1 and 2; the positions of Christian Democrats remain more or less the same. An exception to 
this is provided by CD&V  in Flanders which, given the new institutional and competitive 
context in Belgium, has radicalized her demands for autonomy since the 1970s. Liberal 
(Democratic) parties have, in their support for individual rights, tend to be in favour of 
decentralized federal structures (though backtracking on this aim if the political climate is not 
amenable – i.e. the UK Liberal Democrats since joining a Conservative-led coalition 
government in 2010). Finally, we have witnessed only moderate party repositioning on 
decentralisation in long-standing federal countries such as Germany and Austria, where all 
parties – be they left or right – generally endorse the current structures of the state (Detterbeck, 
2012). 
The responses of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) have also varied 
– with some delighted at the creation of new regional polities and engaging in (coalition) 
governments at that level (CiU in Catalonia, Plaid Cymru in Wales, SNP in Scotland); with 
others radicalizing their demands to include independence, wishing to have nothing to do with 
the ‘pretend’ regional assemblies (iRS in Sardinia) (see Gomez-Reino et al, 2006; Elias and 
Tronconi, 2011). Following the implementation of reforms, however, very few (mainstream) 
parties have sought to overturn decentralization measures. 
This does not mean, however, that parties fully comprehend the scope of what has 
happened, or indeed, how to respond effectively to the challenges of multi-level party systems. 
Ideology has provided some broad parameters for the strategic and organizational responses of 
parties. We have found, for instance, that in contemporary European party systems, it is the 
parties on the Left that tend to be more in favour of decentralization and also more likely to 
regionalize their own party organizations, while parties on the Right generally seek to maintain 
tighter centralized control of the party (see figure 2; also see Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010). 
However it is important to remember that this used to be the opposite case; with the Left in 
favour of the unitary Jacobin state, whiles the Right promoted degrees of (administrative) 
decentralisation (and there were – and still are – also factions within each party that disagree 
with the party leadership on the territorial question).  
As such, there are, as we shall see below, no hard and fast rules as to how parties respond 
to the creation of multi-level party systems or the flourishing of territorial movements seeking 
the radical restructuring, or indeed complete disintegration, of the state. With the rise in 
prominence of a number of SNRPs from the 1970s onwards, the capacity of state-wide parties 
for national integration and representative linkages has been (further) compromised. Given the 
significance of SNRPs’ territorializing influence on politics, it is worth dwelling on these 
political actors in more detail.  
 
The Rise of SNRPs 
Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties have been the subject of a great deal of academic 
debate in the last two decades, and especially in the last few years. In countries throughout the 
world, but particularly in Europe, these parties have been responsible for pushing the agenda 
for radical constitutional change, resulting in decentralization and federalism, and some of them 
have been able to enter government at the regional, and even state, level (Hepburn and Zaslove, 
2009; Elias and Tronconi, 2011). Their core business is sub-state territorial empowerment, 
whereby empowerment involves seeking to represent and advance the particular interests of the 
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sub-state territory (Hepburn, 2009). According to Gomez-Reino, De Winter and Lynch (2006: 
258), the decentralization of political structures ‘represents a major policy victory of autonomist 
parties, as transfer of power from the national to regional authorities constitutes the core 
demand of regionalist parties’. This is especially true given that many of these parties have 
waited so long to see some of their goals realized.  
 While a handful of SNRPs emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, these parties 
made their first big splash in the 1970s (De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Keating, 1998; De Winter 
et al, 2006). During the heyday of the decolonization struggles, the birth of the civil rights 
movement and peace movement, worldwide student protests and economic turmoil following 
the oil crisis of 1973, many SNRPs won the sympathy of regional populations and were elected 
to Parliament.2 Stein Rokkan and his colleagues (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and Urwin, 
1982) developed the most authoritative framework for explaining the emergence of these 
‘peripheral movements’. They argued that during the first wave of centralizing state formation, 
whereby territories were expanded and governed by a single authority, state agencies faced the 
existence of relatively autonomous peripheral communities. A centre-periphery cleavage was 
drawn between the dominant national culture and the ethno-linguistic minorities, which 
mobilized along territorial lines (using whatever territorial, economic or cultural resources were 
available to them) in resisting centralizing and standardizing policies from the centre (Rokkan 
and Urwin, 1982). As such, parties and party systems are formed around such cleavages and 
have the ability to ‘freeze’ them even when the relevance of the cleavage has declined (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967: 50). However, at the time, Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 165) were unable to 
find evidence of ‘unfreezing’ of politics resulting from peripheral movements, which they 
concluded had ‘not been very successful’. They would probably draw different conclusions if 
they applied their framework to today’s politics. 
Once considered to be ‘throwbacks to the past’ (Hobsbawm, 1990), SNRPs have 
established themselves as both reputable and influential political players in most West European 
democracies. Whilst Rokkan and Urwin (1983) identified 29 ‘peripheral parties’, Lane, McKay 
and Newton (1991) put this number at 44 ‘ethnic parties’, and Massetti (2009) has recently 
estimated that 93 such parties exist. Clearly, SNRPs are increasing in numbers, thereby 
contradicting modernization theory that posits that territorial cleavages will be eventually 
ironed-out during the process of nationalization (see Keating, 2009). Not only that, but SNRPs 
have also moved from ‘niche’ actors in party systems to mainstream political players, or ‘protest 
to power’ as Elias and her colleagues argue (Elias, 2009; Elias and Tronconi, 2011). No longer 
the ‘outsider’ in party politics, these parties have successfully entered government at the 
regional and state levels and many have been responsible for pushing the agenda for radical 
constitutional change. SNRPs have also sought to adapt to multi-level politics, by 
differentiating their party machines at different territorial levels – in particular, the 
supranational level. Of note, SNRPs have prolifically taken advantage of opportunities at the 
European level for building alliances and networking, with many endorsing the popular (but 
ultimately disappointing and short-lived) goal of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ (Lynch, 2006; Elias, 
2008, 2009; Hepburn, 2008, 2010). 
SNRPs have also had success, to varying degrees, in entering government at different 
territorial levels (Gomez-Reino et al, 2996; Hepburn and Zaslove, 2009; Stefuriuc, 2009; Elias 
and Tronconi, 2011). With the creation of new sub-state electoral arenas, many SNRPs have 
sought to transform themselves into governing parties at that level. This, however, presents 
multiple challenges for these parties; in decisions crossing the threshold of government 
(especially if they consider themselves ‘anti-system’ parties), in entering coalition government 
and possibly having to moderate/abandon some of their goals as part of a compromise deal, and 
the effects of government incumbency, whereby a poor performance may be severely punished 
                                                 
2 For example, Partido Andalucista, Volksunie in Flanders, Scottish National Party, Unione Démocratique 
Bretonne, Liga Veneta, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, and Convergència i Unió in Catalonia. 
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by their supporters (see Elias and Tronconi, 2001). As such, operating in a multi-level political 
environment often forces these parties to change their strategies, behaviour and in some cases, 
to compromise some of their principles.  
Another major challenge for these parties, which results from the development of a 
multidimensional policy space within multiple political arenas, is the creation of a new political 
rival, in the form of regional branches of state-wide parties that have become more autonomous 
and territorially focussed (Hepburn, 2009; Elias, 2011). The decentralization of state-wide party 
organizations means that SNRPs are no longer the only ones seeking to represent territorial 
interests or presenting alternative constitutional goals. A difficult challenge for SNRPs is when 
the territorial goals of the state-wide party prove more popular than their own aims (for instance 
when regional electorates choose autonomy over independence in a referendum – a scenario 
likely to happen in Scotland in 2014-15), however, the worst-case scenario is when state-wide 
parties effectively ‘steal’ the goals of the SNRPs, rendering them obsolete. This situation 
occurred in Belgium in the 1960s and 1970s, when SNRP success encouraged the Christian 
Democrats to split into two autonomous unilingual parties in 1968 to pursue their separate 
visions of the future of the Belgian state (followed by the splitting of the Liberal and Socialist 
parties along similar Flanders-Walloon lines in the 1970s). Furthermore, the new Belgian 
‘regional’ parties essentially adopted the SNRPs’ positions in their efforts to reform the state 
along federal lines. On the plus side, the aims of the SNRPs had been met; on the down side, 
this act removed their very reason for existing, resulting in a steep electoral decline 
(Deschouwer, 2009). However, regionalist parties continue to have a place in federal Belgium 
– often as coalition brokers. As Gomez-Reino et al (2006: 258) argue, ‘no autonomist party is 
entirely satisfied with the current depth, width and speed of these [decentralization] transfers’. 
Few parties will see that such reforms constitute a ‘mission accomplished’; instead they will 
keep fighting for more powers.  
The next question is: how do state-wide parties respond to this competition from 
SNRPs? The obvious answer is that they must present themselves, and their programmes, as 
serious regional rivals to the nationalist/regionalist party vision. However, the way in which 
they do this varies enormously from place to place and party to party. 
 
The Territorialization of State-wide Parties 
The reconfiguration of political authority across different territorial levels, combined with the 
persistence of regional identities and the rise of SNRPs, has necessitated an adjustment to how 
state-wide parties organize and compete. The creation of multi-layered political arenas means 
that parties can no longer pursue one strategy for office in a single state-wide political arena. 
Instead their priorities are split: they must target different arenas for decision-making at several 
territorial levels. In particular, at the sub-state level, state-wide parties must refocus their 
strategies for different regional contexts (and in European countries, parties must also address 
and compete on European policies and issues).  
The resulting reorganization and re-positioning of parties to compete on these multiple 
territorial levels may be described as the ‘territorialization’ of political parties. We use the term 
territorialization, as opposed to the ‘regionalization’ (Swenden and Maddens, 2009), 
‘federalization’ (Koole, 1996) or ‘decentralization’ (Fabre, 2008; Hopkin and van Houten, 
2009) of parties, for a number of reasons. All of these terms seem to imply that a degree of 
power is given to sub-state party branches, to act autonomously from the central party. 
However, this ignores two different aspects of power relations. First, there is a need to account 
for the direction of power redistribution. Political parties, in responding to multi-level politics, 
may choose to concentrate power at the state or supranational levels, as opposed to devolving 
authority downwards. This is evident, for instance, in the case of Australia whereby local party 
branches have sought to work together to strengthen their national party strategy (Koop and 
Sharman 2008), or in countries in Europe, where parties have developed a strong European arm, 
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which may even interact with regional branches independently of the state level (Moon and 
Bratberg, 2010). In these cases, power is redistributed across multiple levels, which could mean 
upwards to the state or Europe, as well as downwards to the regions. Second, there is a need to 
account for power-sharing and interdependence within parties. The notion of devolving 
authority downwards in parties is unable to account for the fact that that this autonomy may be 
constrained by what Carty (2004: 9) calls ‘a fundamental interdependence of parts’, whereby 
authority is shared across a party, rather than concentrated in a single place. It is therefore 
necessary to take into account the interlocking as well as autonomous aspects of political parties 
as they become more focussed on territorial issues (alongside other old and new cleavages) as 
well as organizationally attuned to multi-level political structures  
The ‘territorial rescaling’ of state-wide parties has a number of dimensions. First, 
regional branches of state-wide parties have adopted stronger territorial party identities and 
rhetoric.  This involves altering party logos, letterheads, posters and other party literature to 
reflect the importance of the locality to the party. It also involved a qualitative change in party 
discourse, emphasizing the importance of the territory (be it culture, identity, social values), 
territorial representation within the state, and often pledges to defend the interests of the 
territory. In some cases this has led to sub-state branches declaring themselves to constitute the 
party representing the nation/region in opposition to SNRPs.  
Second, different sectors of parties have adopted different policy goals. In particular, 
sub-state branches of state-wide parties may develop constitutional alternatives to 
independence to defuse support for SNRPs. This is facilitated by the exploitation and 
repackaging of party traditions with regard to their positions on regional autonomy. All of the 
main party families have both centralizing and decentralizing traditions, as argued earlier. For 
instance, whilst Liberal (Democratic) parties have at times supported the creation of a federal 
state, in which the identities and traditions of a territory are recognized, at other times they have 
opposed ‘particularism’ in any form. Left-wing parties have shifted back and forth between 
centralism and regionalism, the latter especially when they entered alliances with SNRPs. 
Christian Democrat parties have advocated bringing powers to local communities in line with 
the principle of subsidiarity. In every case, however, when competing with SNRPs, regional 
sub-state branches of state-wide parties must emphasize the commitment of the party to a stance 
on decentralization that is seen to outweigh the benefits of secession.  
Third, the territorial rescaling of parties results in the organizational differentiation of 
regional parts from the centre. The fact that sub-state branches often need to differentiate their 
policies from the centre to ‘fit’ the local setting has resulted in a desire for greater sub-state 
organizational independence, with control over candidate selection, finance and electoral 
strategies. This transition has not always met with the blessing of the central party. In many 
cases, the central party’s reluctance to grant concessions to the sub-state branch has led to intra-
party tensions, with regional units threatening to secede. 
Fourth, the territorial rescaling of parties has resulted in new forms of power-sharing 
amongst constituent units. In rescaling party organizations, power and authority no longer rest 
in one single place, but rather different organizational units within parties possess different 
powers and autonomous functions. This raises questions for how the different parts interact 
with, and influence, one another. In this sense, parties are developing new stratarchical 
organizational structures, replacing the hierarchical structures of old (Carty, 2004). In the 
remainder of this chapter, for reasons of space, we will focus in particular on the last two 
dimensions of territorial rescaling, concerning state-wide party organizational responses. 
 
State-wide Party Responses to Multi-level Competition 
Following our argument, we suggest looking at the interaction of two key dimensions when 
exploring the relationships between the central party level and its sub-state branches: the 
strength of joint decision-making structures within party organizations, and the degree of 
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organizational and programmatic autonomy enjoyed by sub-state branches (see Dyck, 1996; 
Deschouwer, 2006). Indicators of joint decision-making are formal and informal linkages 
between state and sub-state units that determine the extent of ‘shared rule’ within parties, 
including mechanisms for regional input into state-wide decision-making, joint party structures 
and the inclusion of regional officials in the state executive. Indicators of sub-state autonomy, 
or ‘self rule’, are regional control over candidate and leadership selection, policy programmes, 
campaign strategies, coalition-building and finance. The combination of different degrees of 
joint decision-making and autonomy creates a set of ideal types of state-wide party 
organizations, which are captured in figure 3 below. Most of these party types are integrated 
across territorial levels. However, the typology also covers bifurcated parties which compete at 
multiple levels but have cut organizational linkages between territorial party layers (Smiley 
1980). We will illustrate each party type by giving some examples. These examples also point 
to the fact that individual parties may move between types over time.      
 
Figure 3: Typology of Multi-level Party Organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consensualist parties 
Consensualist parties have a strong tendency towards uniformity in political appeal and to find 
consensus through joint decision-making. Sub-state branches have only limited autonomy but 
possess privileged access to central party decision-making. There is a high degree of multi-level 
cooperation inside the party organizations resulting in common policies and strategies suiting 
all territorial interests. In terms of membership structures, party bureaucracy, parliamentary 
coordination and career patterns, the links between party levels are extensive. Party elite 
coordination in state executives is one of the main features here. In consensualist parties, 
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everything comes together at the centre which is the ‘heart’ of the party. In the joint federal 
systems of Austria and Germany parties have come to mirror the strong interdependence 
between territorial levels in their internal structures. However, there are differences between 
the more hierarchical approach of the Social Democrats and the more decentralized traditions 
of the bourgeois parties in both countries. Moreover, in recent years, Austrian and German sub-
state party branches have made more extensive use of their formal rights in going their own 
ways (Detterbeck and Jeffery, 2009). Thus, there has been a gradual move from the 
consensualist to the federalist model of territorial party organization. 
 
Federalist parties 
Federalist parties combine strong shared rule with strong self rule. Sub-state branches have 
considerable freedom to decide over internal procedures while at the same time being strongly 
involved in central decision-making processes. There will be a delicate, sometimes contested, 
balance between the institutionalized will to find common ground and the need to allow for 
diversity among the different sub-state branches. Federalist parties are most likely to thrive in 
joint federal systems. The Austrian and German Christian Democrats, which have been 
established in the Länder first before building the state-wide organization, are probably the best 
examples here. Yet, as noted above, the other parties in these countries have come to resemble 
the federalist type more closely over time. 
 
Con-(Federalist) parties 
Like federalist parties, the confederalist type is characterized by elaborate joint decision-making 
mechanisms and a strong element of sub-state autonomy. Here, however,the locus of control 
rests with the constituent parts. The central party coordinates rather than leads the party, the 
sub-state branches delegate organizational competences according to their own preferences.    
Con-(Federalist) parties are most likely to thrive in dual federations. Despite differences 
in the actual degree of standardization in policy-making, party organizations are centred on the 
constituent units (cantons, provinces or states) of the federation in countries like Australia, 
Switzerland and the USA. Regional party branches dispose much of the organizational 
resources and have considerable leeway in devizing their strategies and policies. Nevertheless, 
the central party level has taken on an increasingly important role in coordinating territorial 
interests and levelling out differences. Central bodies have thus become stronger in leading the 
parties and in managing diversity without imposing uniformity (Rydon, 1988; Ladner, 2007). 
The internal flow of power has thus been reconfigured into a ‘two-way street’ (Wekkin and 
Howard 2012). The Latin American federations of Argentina and Brazil show similar 
developments. In both countries, the base of political support is traditionally concentrated at the 
regional level. Provincial and state governors and party bosses are key figures at both central 
and regional party levels. But again, national party bodies have grown stronger in recent 
decades in enforcing party loyalty and discipline (Gordin, 2004; Santos and Pegurier, 2011).    
 
 
Centralist parties 
Centralist parties are integrated by virtue of hierarchical control. The central party interferes 
heavily in sub-state party matters, whereas the regional branches have limited impact on central 
affairs. Both shared rule and self rule are weak. As a result of centralist coordination, which 
extends to all facets of party activities, party cohesion is rather strong. Depending on the 
strategies of the central leadership, these parties will be capable of having uniform party policies 
and electoral tactics across the territory. 
An important route to party centralism seems to be one-party hegemony. In countries 
like India, Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa a dominant party has been (or still is) at the 
centre of federal politics. These ‘catch-all parties’ have brought together a variety of social 
 11 
forces in their quest for power. The centralism in political organizations, often based on 
clientelistic networks, has strengthened the position of state-wide leaders in such parties. 
Looking at developments over time, however, federalism has proved to be a powerful weapon 
for opposition parties to challenge one-party hegemony. In a similar vein, sub-state party elites 
have grown more self-confident in asking for more autonomy or a stronger voice at central 
level. In the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), for example, there has been 
a shift in authority towards the regional party leadership after the party lost power at the state 
level in 2000 (Prud’homme, 2012). More generally speaking, party centralism may be 
conceived of as a means of ‘holding-together’ in plurinational settings (Stepan, 2001). Top-
down hierarchy prevents sub-state branches from adopting autonomist and separatist positions. 
In this sense, central control can serve both the aims of leadership ambitions and national 
integration. ‘Holding-together’ has been an important motto not just of parties like the 
Malaysian Barisan Nasional (BN) or the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa but 
also of state-wide parties in Spain and Italy. In these countries, we may again note differences 
between party families. Conservative parties tend to be more hierarchical than their left-wing 
competitors that show more open leadership structures (Hopkin, 2009; Fabre and Méndez-
Lago, 2009).           
 
Decentralist parties 
Decentralist parties put a strong emphasis on self-rule. In a stratarchical way, there are multiple 
territorial centres of power which operate with a considerable degree of independence from one 
another. While still being integrated parties, most vital activities have been separated between 
territorial levels and vertical links are rather weak. Decentralist parties can have quite distinct 
policy profiles and electoral strategies in different parts of the country. Traditional examples of 
this party type are the Swiss parties or the Australian Liberal Party. Today, there are several 
cases of asymmetrical federalism and regionalism where the relations between the central party 
and individual sub-state branches show decentralist traits. In Great Britain, Labour and the 
Conservatives have devolved substantial powers to their Scottish and Welsh branches while 
establishing only weak instruments of joint decision-making (Bradbury 2006). In Spain, the 
Catalan Socialists and the Conservatives in Navarre (until 2008) enjoyed a special status 
allowing them strong autonomy rights at the sub-state level (Fabre and Méndez-Lago, 2009). 
In Italy, the centre-left Democratic Party has inherited a formally federal party network in 
which, in particular, the sub-state branches in the party strongholds yield significant 
autonomous resources and powers. This, however, rarely translates into influence at the national 
level (Conti et al, 2009). 
 
Bifurcated parties 
Finally, bifurcated parties compete in multiple territorial arenas under the same party label but 
have cut all organizational linkages between state-wide and sub-state levels . The lack of 
common membership and leadership structures allows each party unit to develop its own 
position autonomously. At the same time, bifurcated parties are unable to engage in internal 
multi-level coordination activities with respect to electoral campaigns and public policy-
making. In Canada, the Liberal Party has formally separated into independent federal and 
provincial organizations in four of the nine provinces, including Quebec and British Columbia 
(Thorlakson, 2006). In the other provinces, vertical linkages are comparatively weak. The 
Conservative Party at state-wide level has no organizational connection to the provincial parties 
which bear the same name (Cross, 2004). In Belgium, parties have split along linguistic lines. 
All major parties compete at federal and sub-state levels but restrict themselves to either Dutch-
speaking or French-speaking electorates. Organizational linkages to the ideological ‘sister 
party’ in the other language community have become dormant (De Winter, 2006). Thus, 
Belgian parties are multi-level organizations which operate on a non-state-wide basis.   
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Explaining variance in party responses 
Clearly, state-wide parties have developed a range of different responses to the increasingly 
asymmetrical nature of party competition in federal or decentralized states. Responses have 
varied across countries, as well as across parties within one system. In explaining variation, we 
take clues from some of the major schools of party research (Ware 1996): sociological 
approaches, which focus on social cleavages; institutional approaches, which focus on either 
structural aspects of the polity or the organizational structures of parties; and rational choice 
approaches, which focus on party strategies in competitive environments (see Deschouwer, 
2006; Swenden and Maddens, 2009). 
The first explanation concerns the salience of territorial interests and identities within 
society. The existence of territorial cleavages – including distinct sub-state identities or regional 
economic disparities – can act as an independent factor influencing the organizational decisions 
of state-wide parties (even in the absence of an SNRP that seeks to effectively mobilize these 
interests). In the Spanish or Italian parties, for example, sub-state branch autonomy tends to be 
higher in regions where there is stronger support for sub-state nationalism.  
Second, party responses are affected by the institutional structures of the multi-level 
state. Within this category, two aspects define the environment in which parties operate: the 
territorial structures of the state and the structures of the electoral process. The territorial 
structures of the state determine the degree of interdependence between political levels. In 
federal and regionalized states, these levels can be heavily intertwined or strongly separated. 
To illustrate: the strong linkages between party levels in Austria and Germany mirror the 
extensive cooperation within their federal systems. Furthermore, structures of the electoral 
processes – primarily electoral systems and electoral timing, but also parliamentary rules of 
incompatibility of mandates and state regulations on public funding of parties – must be taken 
into account. As with territorial state structures, electoral structures influence the degree of 
interdependence between political levels. In the UK, for example, differences in electoral 
formula and the separation of devolved elections from Westminster elections have added to the 
distinctiveness of the Scottish and Welsh party systems. 
Our third set of factors relates to ‘sticky’ party traditions, which shape the ways in which 
individual parties distribute power internally and link territorial levels. Party traditions can be 
understood with respect to party ideologies and constitutional aims. In many cases parties adopt 
the organizational structures that they wish to see implemented within the state. Christian 
Democrats, along with Liberals and Greens, may find intra-party decentralization more suited 
to their programmatic profiles and tradition than Social Democrats and the more radical Left. 
Internal party dynamics, while being based on historical trajectories and party ideologies, will 
also be affected by the specific position a party has in a competitive environment. This may 
lead to a stronger propensity to adapt strategically to changing structures of competition. 
Among the most relevant aspects of this fourth explanatory dimension are the access to 
government at state-wide and sub-state levels, variations in electoral strength between different 
arenas and the impact of SNRPs on competitive dynamics. All of these factors will have an 
impact on internal power balances between the central party and regional branches. Quite often, 
parties in government at the state-wide level have seen a diminishing role of the regional party 
“barons” inside their party organizations. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has argued that political parties, which were once instruments of 
national integration, are now faced with the challenge of regionalism, federalism and 
‘denationalization’. It seems that the territorial cleavage, which Rokkan and his colleagues 
posited had only a negligible effect in shaping state-wide party competition in 1982, has since 
borne fruit with the institutionalization of regions over the last thirty years. In addition to the 
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persistence of regions as ‘small worlds’ as containers of political attitudes, behaviour and 
identities, and the consolidation of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties as mainstream 
players in party systems, it is clear that state-wide parties operating in multi-level systems must 
adapt to the territorial cleavages cemented by the institutionalization of political regions. As we 
have shown, there are numerous ways in which political parties have responded to state 
structural change and the strengthening of the territorial dimension of politics. Whilst some 
have sought to reflect new divisions of powers within the state in their own organizational 
strategies, others have held on to the belief that a united party will underpin a unified state. We 
have identified six modes of adaptation amongst the parties: centralist (with centralized 
decision-making and weak joint structures), consensualist (implying consensus through joint 
decision-making), federalist (where parties mix strong intra-party coordination with high 
degrees of flexibility), confederalist (supremacy of the sub-state party level within integrated 
structures), decentralist (where parties devolve significant control to regional branches) and 
bifurcated parties (showing a lack of vertical linkages between levels).  
The re-positioning and reorganization of parties at the regional level heralds a new type 
of political representation in multi-level states. Whilst parties have traditionally claimed to 
represent citizens across the state by appealing to a common political vision, in multi-level 
states it has become difficult to commit the party as a whole to a single policy programme. 
Parties must now adapt to several arenas of political authority, compete with SNRPs on the 
territorial dimension, and accommodate the territorial interests of the regional electorate. This 
has had a significant impact on party systems, causing greater divergence between regional and 
state-wide parties and systems, and leading to new forms of coordination and interdependence 
within parties. Though it is too soon to herald the decline of state-wide political representation, 
state-wide parties must urgently re-think how to maintain their integrative functions in 
increasingly disintegrating party systems, otherwise they run the risk of disintegrating 
themselves.  
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